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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
ployee who had the use of a motorcycle for business during the day
and who drove it home at night with the employer's permission
was held not to be acting within the scope of his employment on his
way home from work. It is arguable that where as here the
servant is free to use the car for his own purposes, such use is not
incidental to the employmenty Had the servant been headed for
the "frolic" from the place of business instead of going home,
surely the defendant would not have been liable.
W. G. W.
M ASTER AND SERVANT - LOAN OF SERVANT TO THIRD PERSON
- LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INJURIES TO STRANGERS BY THE SERV-
ANT. - The defendant coal company was supplied with electric
power by the Appalachian Power Company whose transformer was
situated upon the defendant's land. The power company had
given a key to the transformer station to H, defendant's chief
electrician hired and paid by the defendant. A fire broke out in
a store three miles away from the transformer, and as a result of
the fire a wire leading to it was burned down blowing a fuse at
the transformer causing the lights to die in the defendant's "coal
camp." Defendant's assistant superintendent ordered H to re-
place the fuse. Upon the replacement electricity again circulated
through the fallen line. Plaintiff's decedent, in aiding at the fire,
became entangled with the wire and was electrocuted. Held, that
the defendant was liable for H's negligence in replacing the fuse.
Graft v. Pocahontas Goal Corporation.1
In arriving at a decision there are many difficulties in cases
which involve more than one employer. The rule is well estab-
Reinoehl, 120 Pa. Super. 285, 182 Atl. 120 (1935) (where the salesman stopped
for supper on his way back to the place of business) ; Buckley v. Harkens, 114
Wash. 468, 195 Pac. 250 (1921) (where the company paid the expenses of the
salesman's car).
R Keck v. Gas & Electric Co., 179 Ky. 314, 200 S. W. 452 (1918).
1 "An act of kindness on the part of the employer under such circumstances,
while it may create a spirit of loyalty in the relationship existing between the
employee and the master, cannot be construed to operate as a continuance of
the relationship during a period where, under the law and the facts, such rela-
tionship has actually been suspended." Bloom v. Krueger, 182 Wis. 29, 32,
195 X. W. 851 (1923). Where the employee used the master's car to go home
to lunch, with permission of the master, RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 229,
a comment on the rule of the section says: 'If, however, such acts [furnish-
ing an employee with a car] are for the personal convenience of the employees
and are merely permitted by the master in order to make the employment more
desirable, the acts are not within the scope of employment." Id. at 511.
1190 S. E. 687 (W. Va. 1937).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
lished that a general servant may be lent or hired by his master to
another party for some special purpose so as to become, as to that
service, the servant of the other.2 But when it is necessary to
determine how that relation is created so as to shift the liability to
the "special master" the problem becomes quite perplexing. In
many cases the power of substitution or discharge, the payment of
wages and other circumstances bearing upon the relation are dwelt
upon.' They, however, are not the ultimate facts, but only thoso
more or less useful in determining whose is the work and whose the
power of control.4 It has uniformly been held that if the general
master seeks to escape liability he must show that his relation with
the servant was suspended, for the time being, and a new relation
created between the servant and the third party.' The fact that
one party has not actually exercised control should not be allowed
to mislead, for the criterion is who has the right to control.0 It is
not sufficient, in order to relieve the general master of liability,
that the servant is partially under the control of the third person,
but the new relation must carry with it full and exclusive control,
leaving the general master without right to interfere.7
But all this gives rise to the crucial questions where is the
right of control vested, and how can one determine that such an
2 Consolidated Fireworks Co. v. Koeh], 190 Ill. 145, 60 N. E. 87 (1901);
Coughlan v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 268, 44 N. E. 218 (1896); Driscoll v.
Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. E. 922 (902); Tarr v. Hecla Coal & Coke Co.,
265 Pa. 519, 109 AtI. 224 (1920). I
a Poling v. Ohiol River R. Co., 38 W. Va. 645, 18 S. E. 782 (1893) ; Densby
v. Bartlett, 318 nh 616, 149 N. E. 591 (1925); Muse v. Stem, 82 Va. 33(1886). 6
4 Thompson v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 116 W. Va. 705,.182 S. E. 880 (1935);
MeKain v. Ry. Co., 65 W. Va. 233, 64 S. E. 18 (1909); Layne v. C. & 0. Ry.
Co., 66 W. Va. 607, 67 S. E. 703 (1909) ; Denton v. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., 284 U. S.
305, 52 S. Ct. 141 (1932) ; Linstead v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 276 U. S. 28, 48 S. Ct.
241 (1928); Harding v. St. Louis Stockyards, 242 Ill. 444, 90 X. E. 205(1909); Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. B. 922 (1902).
a Central R. Co. of N. 3. v. De Busley, 261 F. 561 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919); Ram-
sey v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 269 N. Y. 219, 199 N. . 65 (1935); Irwin v. 1lein,
271 N. Y. 477, 3 N. E. (2a) 601 (1936).
"6 Greaser v. Oil Co., 109 IV. Va. 396, 155 S. E. 170 (1930); Linstead v. C.
& 0. Ry. Co.; Denton v. Yazoo, etc. R. Co., both supra n. 4; Sargent Paint Co.
v. Petrovitzky, 234 Mass. 93, 124 N. E. 881 (1920); Baldwin v. Abraham, 67
N. Y. Supp. 1079 (1901); Highman v. T. W. Waterman Co., 32 R. I. 578, 80
At. 178 (1911).
7 Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252 (1908) ; Ramble
v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 164 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908); Miller v.
Ry. Co., 76 Iowa 655, 39 N. W. 188 (1888); Quinby v. Estey, 221 Mass. 56,
108 N. E. 908 (1915); Hussey v. Franey, 205 Mass. 413, 91 N. E. 391 (1910);
Central R. Co. of N. J. v. DeBusley; Ramsey v. N. Y. C. R. Co., both supra
n. 5; Higgins v. Western Union, 156 N. Y. 75, 50 N. E. 500 (1898); Tarr v.
Hecla Coal & Coke Co., 265 Pa. 519, 109 Atl. 224 (1920).
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absolute surrender has been made? It has been suggested that
the enigma may sometimes be solved by finding which of the two
possible masters was bound to perform the work in which the em-
ployee was engaged at the time." But it is quickly discerned that
this test is not infallible even though useful under certain cir-
cumstances, for it has been held that a servant paid and employed
by one person may, for the time being, be the servant of another
in a particular transaction even though the general master may be
interested in the work.9 And this last statement seems to be borne
out by the present case.'10 But in any circumstances the test of
whose work is being done is quite helpful in leading to a determi-
nation of the party in whom, the ultimate right of control is vested.
It is submitted that the premier criterion for determination of the
party upon whom the liability will rest is whether the act done
is so far under the control of the third party that he may, at any
time, stop it or continue it, and may determine the way it shall be
done, not merely in reference to the result to be reached, but in
reference to the manner of reaching the result.' 1 *What acts con-
stitute such control have not been spelled out by the courts, but
it has been clearly settled that the fact that the third party points
out the work to be done by the servant is not sufficient to take him
out of the control of the general master, nor will the mere giving
of signals to start and stop operate to make such a change. 2 The
fact that control has been divided does not raise the inference that
the right of absolute control has been surrendered, but there is a
presumption that the right continues in the general master, and
the burden is upon him to prove that it has been completely re-
8 Harding v. St. Louis Stockyards, 242 Ill. 444, 90 N. E. 205 (1909) ; Quinby
v. Estey, 221 Mass. 56, 108 N. E. 908 (1915); Eckert v. Merchants' Ship-
building Corp., 280 Pa. 340, 124 Atl. 477 (1924).
9 Higgins v. Western Union, 156 N. Y. 75, 50 N. E. 500 (1898) ; Wylfle v.
Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 281 (1893).
10 In the present case it might be found that both the defendant and the
power company were interested in keeping the current circulating through the
community by the fact that the defendant regularly employed an electrician
to remedy defects in electrical equipment which would include the blowing of
this fuse.
1 lFrenyea v. Maine Steel Co., 132 Me. 271, 170 AtI. 515 (1934) ; Shepard
v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110, 90 N. E. 392 (1910); McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N.
Y. 291, 126 N. E. 244 (1919).
12P uller v. McCloskey, 228 U. S. 194, 33 S. Ct. 471 (1913); Standard Oil
Co. v. Anderson; Quinby v. Estey; Ramsey v. N. Y. C. R. Co., all supra n. 7;.
Yelloway, Inc. v. Hawkins, 38 F. (2d) 731 (1930); Driscoll v. Towle, 181
Mass. 416, 63 N. E. 922 (1902); McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N. Y. 291; 126
N. E. 244 (1919).
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linquished.13 However, the proposition that there may be a shift-
ing of liability with the relinquishment of the right of exclusive
control Idoes not alter the remaining fact that there may be two or
more masters of the same servant at the same time for the same
act. 4  Where such is the case the weight of authority seems to
point that there may be joint and several liability upon such joint
masters for the negligent injuries to strangers caused by that ser-
vant. 5
H. G. W.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - USURY - LACES. - In 1925
P, for a loan of $10,000 from the Mortgage Security Corporation
of America, gave sixteen six per cent notes and seven subordinate
non-intere'st bearing notes covering certain fees for guaranteeing
the notes, obtaining the guarantee of another surety company, and
for servicing. Both series of notes were secured by a deed of trust
on the property which was improved by the money borrowed. P
made payments for almost eight years which paid the semi-annual
interest to all note holders and retired all the notes but six which
were of the principal series. These six notes were then in the hands
of defendants, holders in due course. Both guarantors of the notes
had become insolvent. P, having defaulted, brought this suit to
enjoin the apprehended sale of the property under the deed of trust
and to purge the loan of usury. The lower court found that the
sum evidenced by the subordinate notes with- the exception of a
few small items was in fact usurious interest charged and gave a
decree against the mortgage company (insolvent) for the amount
of the usury and interest, dismissing the suit as to the other de-
fendants. On appeal, affirmed. Held, one justice dissenting, that
the principal and subordinate notes all having been given for one
consideration are all tainted with usury; that although the de-
fense of usury is applicable against a holder in due course, P is
,13 Central R. of N. J. v. DeBusley, 261 Fed. 561 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919);
Bart6lomeo v. Bennett Co., 245 N. Y. 66, 256 N. E. 98 (1927); Charles v.
Barret, 233 N. Y. 127, 135 N. E. 199 (1922).
14 Moore v. Southern Ry. Co., 165 N. C. 439, 81 S. E. 603 (1914) ; Brow v.
Boston & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 399, 32 N. E. 362 (1892).
is Brow v. Boston & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 399, 32 N. E. 362 (1892); White
v. Fitchburg R. Co., 136 Mass. 321 (1884); Williams v. Southern R. Co., 102
Miss. 617, 59 So. 850 (1912) ; Molling v. Barnard, 65 Mo. App. 601 (1896) ;
Moore v. Southern R. Co., 165 N. C. 439, 81 S. E. 603 (1.914); American Cot-
ton Co. v. Simmons; 39 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 87 S. W. 842 (1905).
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